

# LUL and sub-LUL sector reports and responses

Period: 13/12/09 to 06/03/10

Document information:			
<b>Prepared by</b>	S Beevor	<b>Date of Version</b>	18/03/2010
<b>Checked by</b>	K Morley	<b>Final Version</b>	1.0

## Contents

40879 Fatigued staff less responsive to incidents .....	3
40853 'Unhygienic' toilet facilities .....	3
40747 Double shifting and lack of PPE and permits .....	4
40909 Staff not briefed on evacuation procedures for new Northern ticket hall .....	5
40925 Health and safety concerns on-site at Finsbury Park .....	6
40685 Use of white signalling lights can cause confusion for train operators .....	8
40901 'Mind the gap' messages overridden by customer service announcements	9
40935 Agency staff working 'unsafely' at Clapham South .....	10
40940 Unsafe practices at Amersham Underground station .....	12
40917 Fire extinguishers need replacing at Waterloo .....	13
40929 XTP projection distracting tube drivers at stations .....	14
40906 Finchley Central Group stations without supervisors .....	15
40918 Staff not following protocol during emergency .....	16
40899 Staff working 'excessive' consecutive shifts .....	17

## **40879 Fatigued staff less responsive to incidents**

A reporter is concerned that the amount of overtime being working at the Finsbury Park group of stations on the Piccadilly line is affecting the ability of station supervisors to respond to incidents effectively. The stations affected in this group are: Caledonian Road, Holloway Road, Arsenal, Manor House, and Finsbury Park.

It is claimed that the actual level of overtime being worked is being masked by transferring hours over to the following month. The reporter believes that anyone working more than 40 additional hours overtime is breaching the regulations. Exceedances happen frequently and systematically, but are said to be largely ignored. Another effect of working more overtime is that staff may end up working up to nine consecutive days.

This all contributes to fatigue and reduced mental alertness, meaning staff are less able to deal with an emergency. Another consequence is that they are less able to check the work contractors have done. On occasion, supervisors are so tired they fail to make it down the stairs to check the work that is meant to have been completed. The actual overtime worked in a given month is recorded on the Sutor sheets, which show any exceptions to regular working at stations. The reporter suggests that:

- the permissible number of hours per month worked on overtime be clarified; and
- the Sutor sheets be cross-referenced with the station log books.

## **Response from LUL**

There is an independent audit into reports of possible breaches of working patterns including overtime procedures involving the Finsbury Park group. The recommendations will be used to ensure compliance to the framework agreement. Overtime working is by mutual agreement between the member of staff and the group station manager, or their representative. Where overtime work is necessary it is rotated amongst the staff concerned to ensure an even spread. Full time staff are not expected to work more that 30 per cent in excess of their contractual hours in any four week period. Overtime working is approved and signed off by duty managers who issue a reference number (overtime number) as authorisation for the overtime to be worked. A requirement of the LUL competency management system is that staff take sufficient rest and relaxation in accordance with LUL framework prior to attending duty to ensure personal alertness and fitness at all times.

Due to local activities at Finsbury Park station, football and other sport events at the Arsenal Emirates Stadium there are opportunities for staff to do overtime working when available, especially on match days. Overtime hours are entered on 'SAP' system which is monitored as part of the Centurion Manager System checks.

## **40853 'Unhygienic' toilet facilities**

A reporter is concerned about the portable toilet facilities provided on-site at Aldgate East station, which are said to be unhygienic. There is no lighting in or near the

toilets and as a result staff are unable to see what they are doing and also cannot see to wash their hands. Further to this, the water supply for the sinks is open within the toilet and so the reporter fears that staff could be washing their hands in contaminated water. For staff to be able to see what they are doing the toilet door has to be left open, but this practice is of course not ideal and the toilets are visible to members of the public.

In addition, the reporter mentions that drinking water is not provided on-site, meaning staff are unable to have a drink before their shift or during their breaks.

Could Balfour Beatty comment on the possibility of:

- installing lighting near or within the portable toilets; and
- providing staff with access to drinking water whilst on-site.

## **Response from Balfour Beatty Management**

Installing lighting near or within the portable toilets.

It is true that we have experienced some problems in the past with regards to the lighting levels and cleanliness of the portable toilets provided for our contractors working at Aldgate East station. There has been a recent significant increase in the number of people using these facilities and following a review of the cleaning regime we have increased the frequency of cleaning from three to six times a week to meet the demands of the enlarged workforce.

Furthermore, all the original toilets have now been removed from site and new units installed which are fully equipped with hot and cold running water. The lack of lighting in the vicinity of the toilet units has also been addressed with all the individual units now having their own mains bulkhead lighting installed.

However, there is no validity to the claim that the toilets can be seen by the public when they are open as the units have always been entirely enclosed within a high level hoarding.

Providing staff with access to drinking water whilst on-site.

This claim has no validity as, from the outset there has always been access to drinking water whilst on-site. This has been provided by means of a water dispenser adjacent to the site manager's desk. However, with the continued progression of the refurbishment works, this has now been relocated to a newly redecorated room and it is possible that that some operatives had not been advised of it whereabouts. We apologise for this lapse in communication and have now addressed the situation at our pre-shift meetings.

## **40747 Double shifting and lack of PPE and permits**

A reporter is concerned over staff working multiple double shifts at Associated Trade Services. There are also concerns over a lack of PPE and some staff working without the correct permits.

Some staff at Associated Trade Services are regularly working up to five consecutive double shifts in a week, according to the reporter. This poses a risk to

the staff themselves and to their colleagues, as they are more likely to have an accident if fatigued. This practice should be evident from the signing on sheets.

Staff are not always provided with the appropriate PPE, and so they may have to work on-site in trainers or without proper gloves. It is also reported that staff are regularly let on-site even though they do not have the proper work permits and might therefore not be familiar with the unique hazards of working on the underground.

The reporter would like to see the practice of double shifting cease, and for staff to always be provided with the correct PPE. Also, the reporter feels that no staff should be allowed access to a site if they do not possess the correct permits. Please comment.

## Response from Tube Lines

This is very similar to a previous report against Associated Trade Services (ATS) which proved to be incorrect. The following actions were taken:

- time sheets were requested for operatives employed by ATS. ATS also provided invoices from the self employed operatives sent to them for the period in question and Tube Lines could find no evidence of double shifting;
- ATS have provided Tube Lines with copies of the entry permits for ATS operatives and all appear to be in order. We can find no evidence to suggest otherwise;
- Tube Lines can find no evidence of staff working with incorrect PPE. All staff employed by Tube Lines and their contractors are randomly checked through our MXES programme of site monitoring visits to assure ourselves that our contractors and internal staff are complying with our PPE policy and HS&E procedures. ATS are subject to these HSE monitoring, the most recent observation findings revealed ATS to be fully compliant at all levels; and
- having interviewed ATS staff and read all documentation provided, Tube Lines cannot find evidence to support the allegations of 'double shifting' or entry permitted onto sites without the appropriate safety/access documentation. Tube Lines has sent correspondence to all framework contractors reminding them of the responsibilities to ensure that their operatives are fully trained for their duties, have the minimum requirement of an entry permit to attend our sites and that they do not exceed working hours.

From the investigation it appears that relevant tool box talks are given by ATS to their employees for the activities undertaken including PPE inspections.

## 40909 Staff not briefed on evacuation procedures for new Northern ticket hall

A reporter has contacted CIRAS about station staff at Kings Cross underground station not being briefed on evacuation procedures for the new Northern ticket hall. The reporter comments that since the area opened on 29 November 2009 neither the customer service assistants, supervisors or ticket office staff have been told what to do during an evacuation.

Previously staff were able to evacuate the station quickly and professionally but now staff are unfamiliar with the long passageways and are unsure how the new fire doors operate. The reporter believes this could lead to passengers or staff becoming trapped during an evacuation.

- Could LUL ensure that staff are briefed on the evacuation procedures for this new part of station?
- The reporter would also like to know if staff are meant to receive regular refresher training on the process and a debrief after an evacuation has been carried out?

## Response from LUL

Complete familiarisation of the Northern ticket hall and the evacuation procedure was completed for all staff before opening on the 29 November 2009. In addition an evacuation briefing note was issued to each member of staff which included their actions for each location they may be required to work.

The congestion control and emergency plan was reviewed. Station supervisors were given a copy that included the location of the fire doors. These are the same as the fire doors that were fitted in the tube and western sides of the station in 2007. Station familiarisation and evacuations are completed on a six monthly basis by the station supervisor.

All staff on duty during an evacuation complete an evacuation debrief which covers the actions they took during the evacuation, this is completed by the station supervisor and duty station manager.

On the 22 December 2009 Kings Cross LUL evacuated because the fire alarm was activated. The debrief paperwork was reviewed, and the staff involved were spoken to. Those that were spoken to believed the evacuation went as planned. The station supervisor on duty was impressed with the staff's actions, and noted that it only took eight minutes to evacuate the entire station. The interface with St Pancras station worked well and their staff stopped customers entering Kings Cross LUL.

## 40925 Health and safety concerns on-site at Finsbury Park

A reporter has a number of health and safety concerns about a site at Finsbury Park Underground station.

The first concern surrounds the discovery of asbestos on the site near to where staff were working. The reporter comments that it took a number of weeks before the asbestos was removed from the site; in the mean time staff were still carrying out work nearby without specialised PPE. The reporter would like to know:

- if staff need to wear special PPE when working near asbestos;
- if an investigation or risk assessment was carried out with regards to the asbestos; and
- if any, what were the findings?

The second concern regards the facilities available to staff on-site. The reporter mentions that:

- there is no hot water for staff to wash with after carrying out sometimes very dirty work;
- occasionally there is no drinking water on the site, which the reporter believes is a requisite for staff to work on-site; and
- occasionally there are no alcoholic wipes available for staff to clean their hands or faces with.

Could Tube Lines comment on the:

- possibility of installing hot water on the site for staff to wash with; and
- the occasional absence of drinking water and alcoholic wipes.

## **Response from Tube Lines**

Finsbury Park station had been surveyed for asbestos and the presence of asbestos was notified to the project in accordance with our procedures. Works were agreed to remove any asbestos that was likely to be disturbed by the project. A copy of our TLF187 is held on-site by the project which details the presence of asbestos and any measures to be taken.

Working alongside asbestos containing materials if not disturbed presents no risk to staff and special PPE is not required.

From these questions, we get the impression that the staff have not attended our asbestos awareness course if they had they would have an understanding of the processes.

Regarding the possibility of installing hot water on the site for staff to wash with - hot water for washing is available for use by all construction staff at the Isledon Road site compound. Problems were previously encountered with the hot water supply due to low water pressure; but Tube Lines resolved this in November 2009 by means of additional pumping.

During the recent unusually cold spell in January, problems were experienced with water supply in the site compound due to the mains supply freezing. To mitigate this Tube Lines made arrangements with London Underground for construction staff to use the station welfare facilities at Wells Terrace on a short term basis. A Tube Lines welfare vehicle was also hired and parked at Wells Terrace during this period.

Regarding the occasional absence of drinking water and alcoholic wipes - Tube Lines provides drinking water on the work site from a water cooler. Bottled water is also provided at the site compound and a new water dispenser is being installed. Alcoholic wipes are provided on-site by Tube Lines, but Tube Lines will order additional stocks for the site to ensure uninterrupted supply.

## **40685 Use of white signalling lights can cause confusion for train operators**

The use of white signalling lights during maintenance on London Underground infrastructure is a topic of concern for one reporter. White lights are used during possessions by train masters to call on or stop trains. However the reporter states that because there are often many other white lights in use at such times, particularly at night, it can prove difficult for train operators to distinguish which light is meant for them.

This may result in a train operator reacting to a light that he is not required to respond to and consequently run someone over, derail the train or cause infrastructure damage.

The reporter proposes a system whereby amber and red lights are used to call on and stop the train respectively, to prevent any confusion or misinterpretation on part of the train operator. Would Tube Lines and Metronet consider this?

### **Response from LUL**

We thank the reporter for highlighting the fact that white signalling lights are being used by train masters to call on or to stop trains during possessions.

*Rule Book 14* states that protection staff must “show the engineer’s train operator a yellow hand signal” when leaving a possession. Although not explicitly described in the *Rule Book*, this can and should be interpreted as showing a yellow lamp or a yellow flag when directing trains; depending on the time of day. LUL protection services have now imposed on their supplier, Morsons, the use of Bardic lamps (coloured lamps) during possessions which will eliminate the concerns raised by the reporter for the future.

Post response from LUL protection services:

The process of rolling out Bardic lamps for the use of protection staff undertaking certain activities is underway, however due to supply shortages of lamps and batteries the full compliment of Bardic lamps will not be available to all who require them. This shortage will be temporary.

What Bardic lamps are held in stores will be issued for use during possession works. Safety critical checks will be undertaken to ensure that the use of said lamps is being undertaken by our protection supplier Morson.

### **Response from Tube Lines**

Having discussed this report with senior construction managers p-way projects and having reviewed the LUL *Rule Book* there is no evidence or reference found to the use of such lights for this purpose. Train masters would use and do use red lights for purposes as described by the reporter. It would only be in the cases of extreme emergency that a standard torch or other light would be used; no such emergencies have been reported to date.

## 40901 'Mind the gap' messages overridden by customer service announcements

A reporter is concerned that customer service messages are able to interrupt 'mind the gap' messages when tube trains arrive at Westminster and Waterloo stations. This happens occasionally at off-peak times - perhaps once every half a dozen trains - on the westbound District platform at Westminster station, and at Waterloo on the southbound Bakerloo platform. During peak times, this is not an issue because staff on the platforms have been instructed to say 'mind the gap' on their handheld microphones.

The issue arises because customer service announcements are prioritised over the 'mind the gap' messages in the system's message hierarchy. In the reporter's view, safety critical 'mind the gap' messages should sit above the customer service announcements, but beneath the emergency evacuation announcements in the hierarchy.

'Mystery shopper' type surveys on London Underground place an emphasis on whether customer service messages can be heard in different parts of the station. Interestingly, 'mind the gap' messages do not appear to feature in the surveys - the reporter asks why this is the case? Though the messages can be heard within the train by passengers, they are not as easily heard by those standing on the platform. And though warning signs are painted onto the platforms, a partially sighted person would not see them.

Could the message system be reprogrammed to reflect the fact that 'mind the gap' messages are more important? This might help prevent an incident where someone slips between the train and platform.

### Response from LUL

The reporter states that customer service messages are interrupting 'mind the gap' occasionally at off peak times. This is typically when customer volumes are lower than the peak times and therefore the frequency of Platform Train Interface (PTI) crossings is reduced, resulting in a lower overall PTI risk. LUL take PTI safety performance seriously, with the result that that pre-recorded 'mind the gap' messages are one of a range of technical PTI risk control measures that includes CCTV, yellow hazard lines and under platform lighting.

The *Category 1 LU Engineering standard, Operational Information Systems standard* (number 1-142, September 2009), *Section 3.2.14*, outlines the priority order of live and pre-recorded announcements for platforms. Localised live announcements via the platform Station Announcement Points (SAP) or radio microphone, broadcasted to their respective platforms is assessed within the standard as a slightly higher priority than pre-recorded announcements such as 'mind the gap'. This allows for a 'real time' and 'on-site' decision with regard to customer service and safety announcements to be made, dependent on changing operational conditions without reducing the importance of PTI related announcements.

The *Staff Information Survey (SIS)* which has replaced the *Mystery Shopper Survey* on LUL focuses on real time information and staff customer service. 'Mind the gap'

messages initiated from the SAP or radio microphones are scored in the survey but pre-recorded messages are not itemised in the SIS because as the reporter correctly mentions that 'mind the gap' messages are safety related, which is why they are monitored by the SQE auditors during their operational audit programme.

## **40935 Agency staff working 'unsafely' at Clapham South**

A reporter is concerned that agency staff are working unsafely on a station refurbishment project at Clapham South after a number of near misses and incidents. The reporter believes this is mostly down to inadequate planning.

Heavy equipment has been moved down staircases without due care and attention, and without a method statement. In other scenarios, cutting work has taken place in the computer equipment rooms with little evidence of planning. Electrical isolations have not been arranged for this work, and not everyone on-site has been informed it has been taking place – again, the lack of a method statement is apparent. In addition basic PPE, such as dust masks, is sometimes unavailable where it is required.

Agency staff feel largely unable to challenge acts perceived as unsafe for fear of being dismissed from the site. The reporter would like to see a few improvements in safety culture with:

- lessons learned from near misses and incidents;
- ongoing concerns taken seriously;
- method statements provided and signed for; and
- appropriate PPE provided where necessary.

Please comment.

## **Response from Tube Lines**

1. Heavy equipment has been moved down staircases without due care and attention, and without a method statement.

The Enhance/IPS method statement was approved and in place before any work commenced on-site - (copy available on request). The incident has been investigated by a huge number of people including the construction team, HS&E team, comms team and contractor (copy of document available). The actions to be taken on this are specified in this report and this incident has been closed out by HS&E team after following up the actions.

2. Cutting work has taken place in the computer equipment rooms with little evidence of planning.

The labour only '*Builders' Work' Method Statement addendum* was in place to replace damaged raised access floor tiles, the cutting work refers to the use of a reciprocating saw (5 raised floor tile perimeter cuts). QUA54 trained operative in attendance.

3. The reporter has stated electrical isolations have not been arranged for this work.

Electrical isolations would not be required for the cutting work in the computer equipment room (CER) which we think the reporter is referring to the new floor tile repairs- a reciprocating saw was used to cut the 600mm x 600mm floor tiles - this was carried out outside of the CER on a purpose made workbench. When electrical isolations have been required the level three electrician has always followed Tube Lines LOTO Procedure and Permit to Isolate Forms are stored in site files.

4. Basic PPE, such as dust masks, is sometimes unavailable where it is required. The labour only supplier Fast Track (FT) is required to provide basic PPE to all employees but Tube Lines also has emergency PPE available within the Tube Lines Balham Hill stores. (FT carries out regular visits to all sites and distribute PPE). The project manager checked the stores and confirmed six boxes of dust masks (around 120 pieces) were available.

5. Agency staff feel largely unable to challenge acts perceived as unsafe for fear of being dismissed from the site.

We continuously give the message to staff that HS&E is the value in our works sites. This follows with the tool box talks about HS&E issues. All the team knows the importance of reporting IRFs and predictive metrics. As we are preparing this site for the next Projects Safety Award Nomination, we are trying to start a 'Be Safe' programme and very keen to improve behavioural based safety at site. It is hard to believe that anybody in Tube Lines including agency staff feel largely unable to challenge acts perceived as unsafe for fear of being dismissed from the site. During the kick off meeting of Clapham South with Fast Track managers the project manager (PM) told everyone that anybody can challenge, to any level of supervision, if there are acts perceived as unsafe. It was mentioned that HS&E is our value and we are responsible to send everybody home safely everyday no matter what the job is going on. There is no discussion on this.

6. The reporter would like to see a few improvements in safety culture with:

- lessons learned from near misses and incidents - after the incident in the compound, we changed the managing of the compound. The APM for Clapham South was appointed as the responsible manager for the compound and has already prepared the action plan and started maintaining the compound. The last incident related with noise curtains yesterday has been investigated and actions taken immediately. This is the general IRF procedure and our team is closing the IRF's actions immediately without any delay;
- ongoing concerns taken seriously - Tube Lines can confirm that any concern is taken seriously in our sites and we will continue to make it sure this is how we work;
- method statements provided and signed for - we have sheets of method statements (MS) for Clapham South. The total 15 signed and provided MS shows that this claim doesn't show the real case. We get regular surveillance from our quality assurance team and we have never received a comment from them that MS aren't provided or signed; and
- appropriate PPE provided where necessary.

As it mentioned above, the labour only supplier (FT) is required to provide basic PPE to all employees but Tube Lines also has emergency PPE available within the Tube Lines Balham Hill stores. Fast Track's night manager regularly visits all their sites and makes sure that all his employees have the required PPE for the works.

Action plan going forward:

- the PM will arrange a meeting immediately with our HSE supervisor and our construction team to go through all the HSE measures taken at Clapham South;
- the PM will contact Fast Track managers regarding PPE and check if they are supplying the required PPE for their labour;
- if any person is dismissed from our sites, the reason will be communicated, agreed and recorded with Fast Track managers to clarify the reason of this dismissal;
- the PM will check if anybody is working on our sites without required PPE and take necessary actions;
- the PM will get the record of MS briefing sheets for Clapham South to check if there is any truth in the above claims related with MS;
- the PM will make regular visits to the site during extended working hours and make contact with workforce personally;
- a toolbox talk with all our workforce will be done to give the message that nobody can be dismissed from site for challenging acts perceived as unsafe. This toolbox talk will be given by the PM or Tube Lines senior construction manager;
- 'Be Safe' programme will start at this site as soon as possible to improve the behavioural safety;
- the compound upgrade will be completed as soon as possible; and
- 'Beacon assessment' will be completed and the site will be ready for 'Beacon Status'.

## 40940 Unsafe practices at Amersham Underground station

A reporter has witnessed works being carried out at Amersham Underground station whilst tube trains are running on the tracks, and whilst passengers are entering the station or on the platforms.

Although the work at the station is being carried out behind hoardings, staff have been seen carrying wheelbarrows and equipment over the public footbridge. The reporter does mention that staff stop what they are doing when passengers enter the platform, but believes this still presents a hazard. Hoardings have also been seen to move away from the platform edge when a train enters the platform, sometimes leaving debris behind on the platform.

The reporter is concerned that a member of the public could slip, trip or fall due to debris left on the platform or footbridge and doesn't understand why such work is being carried out whilst the station is still in use.

Could Birse Metro answer the following:

- Are staff allowed to carry out such work whilst the track is still live with trains and passengers are on the station?
- What procedures does Birse Metro have in place to ensure the public are not at risk from work being carried out in this way?
- Could a site visit be undertaken to ensure that unsafe practices are not occurring and all staff are following the correct work site procedures?

## Response from Birse Metro

In response to the questions asked in the report:

1. Are staff allowed to carry out such work whilst the track is live with trains and passengers are on the station?

Some work is allowed in traffic hours and this has been agreed by London Underground, all work is behind hoardings or Heras fencing whose installation was approved by London Underground. Access to the main work site during the day is from outside the station and does not require platform access.

There is limited movement of materials and tools over the public footbridge during the day, this is via a public right of way which does not require access to the station platforms. The footbridge is enclosed to shoulder height so there is no risk to trains from materials being dropped. No materials that would leave debris on the footbridge, have taken place. Birse Metro have not carried any tools or materials over the London Underground station footbridge to the island platform in traffic hours, however we have witnessed other contractors not associated with our works carry over tools and materials.

2. What procedures does Birse Metro have in place to ensure the public are not at risk from work being carried out in this way?

All work is risk assessed and controlled by a method statement that is vetted by the project, Birse Metro health & safety department and London Underground. Regular project HSQE London Underground inspections are carried out to ensure that all activities closely adhere to the method statement.

3. Could a site visit be undertaken to ensure that unsafe practices are not occurring and all staff are following the correct work site procedures?

Two site visits have been conducted; the Heras fencing is securely tied to the station structure and although some minor movement is possible it does not constitute a hazard to trains. To avoid the risk of debris encroaching onto the platform, additional netting and 'kick-boards' has been installed to the fencing. No equipment or materials that could leave debris on the public footbridge is allowed and this requirement has been reinforced on-site.

## 40917 Fire extinguishers need replacing at Waterloo

CIRAS has received a report about fire extinguishers that need replacing at Waterloo underground station. The reporter is aware of numerous discharged or out-of-date fire extinguishers in staff only parts of the station such as equipment rooms and offices. It is believed that management are aware of the issue but have taken little

action to rectify it and the reporter feels it has not been taken seriously. In the event of a fire, extinguishers would not be available for use by staff.

Could LUL ensure that all discharged or out-of-date fire extinguishers are replaced as soon as possible?

## **Response from LUL**

The Waterloo group management has designated a staff only part of the station where redundant fire extinguishers are stored prior to collection for disposal. Station checks, which are conducted in accordance with *Operational Standards Rule Book 11*, have not revealed any discharged or out-of-date fire extinguishers.

If, in the future, any fire extinguishers were to be found discharged or out-of-date management can assure that they would be removed immediately, stored in the appropriate area and replaced with fire extinguishers fit for use.

## **40929 XTP projection distracting tube drivers at stations**

A reporter has expressed concern about the distraction caused to tube drivers by light emitted from the XTP projectors used for digital advertising on station platforms. The light could distract a driver from a safety critical task before the train stops completely.

The reporter comments that just as the train enters the platform the light from the projector shines through the side window of the cab, and into the driver's direct line of sight. It is believed that XTP projectors can be programmed so that they switch off just before the train enters the platform. The reporter would like to see this done across all stations where there are XTP projectors. Would LUL consider reviewing this?

## **Response from LUL**

Following the successful trial of cross track projection (XTP) equipment at various stations across the LUL network, this equipment has been introduced across the network.

It would appear that some mis-communication occurred during the consultation and installation process, and we would like to take this opportunity to clarify a number of points:

- whenever possible, the XTP equipment switches off before the train reaches the image. The reasons for this automatic switch off are commercial and not safety related: the advertisers do not wish to see the picture of their product being distorted by the train. It was never the case that the XTP equipment would switch off because of safety reasons;
- the time it takes between the train entering the platform and the XTP equipment switching off varies between stations, caused by varying technical constraints encountered at different stations, for example because of the curvature of the platform; and

- as part of the assurance process, safety justification for the XTP equipment went to our highest level of safety review, the directors assurance review team (DART). It was established at that forum that there is no safety reason to turn off the XTP at all: it can continue to operate continuously while a train enters, is berthed in and departs from a platform without any impact on safety.

A regular reminder has been published in the *Traffic Circular* during 2009 and planned for Feb 2010 in relation to XTP. The content of which is as follows:-

The following are references to XTP as appearing in online *Traffic Circulars* contained in the Operational Standards website.

This notice appeared in *Traffic Circulars* TC 35 Aug 09, TC 36 Aug 09, TC 37 Sep 09, TC 38 Sep 09 and TC 05 Feb 10:

## TO OPERATIONAL STAFF – ADVERTISING CROSS TRACK PROJECTION (XTP)

Please **DO NOT** disconnect power to the Cross Track Advertising Projectors if they do not blank as the train approaches and/or when stationary on the platform as this action may cause damage to the equipment for which LUL may be liable.

If a XTP unit fails to blank please report it as a fault via the FRC **and** inform the LUL advertising team as follows:

- during office hours on auto 53302 and 53303
- other times email: [Margaret.Prempeh@tube.TfL.Gov.UK](mailto:Margaret.Prempeh@tube.TfL.Gov.UK) who will ensure that the unit is remotely shut down asap.

## 40906 Finchley Central Group stations without supervisors

A reporter is concerned about the lack of supervisors present at certain London Underground stations on the Finchley Central, Bounds Green and Edgware Groups. In some cases, just a customer service assistant (CSA) is present and would be expected to deal with an emergency - should one arise - without a supervisor present. This is apparently due to cutbacks in overtime.

The reporter believes that CSAs are not trained, or experienced enough, to deal with emergencies involving operational incidents or evacuations, and are being left to operate the stations on their own whilst supervisors are off sick or on leave. In the reporter's view this poses an ongoing risk to staff and passengers because there can be a considerable delay in obtaining the appropriate help from a supervisor at another station.

The reporter understands that a supervisor holding the necessary license and with the required training should always be present at stations. Please comment.

## Response from LUL

The Finchley Central group did have a number of stations unstaffed recently due to a combination of sickness and annual leave. The group is also carrying a number of

vacancies and with restrictions on overtime, it did mean that we were not able to cover every duty and managers have had to prioritise staff coverage.

Staffing every station throughout the day is a fundamental part of our service and will continue to be so. Sometimes, due to a combination of circumstances, we are unable to achieve this and have to put contingency arrangements in place. These arrangements can include prioritising those stations which can be left unstaffed if absolutely necessary.

Before this can happen local management will consider whether there are other station supervisors within the station group available or if none are available, whether there are any other station staff competent and familiarised to carry out the role of a station supervisor. Throughout this period, the GSM and his team have been prioritising which stations to leave unstaffed if necessary, and moving staff around the group to ensure that the larger or key stations are kept open.

LUL *Rule Book 11 Section 8.2* makes provision for surface stations to be unstaffed, and also gives clear instructions as to which activities must not be carried out and those that can by any remaining staff, who are appropriately licensed and familiarised.

Duties that can be carried out by staff if a station supervisor is not present which specifically ensure customer safety include:

- evacuating the station in an emergency;
- giving information to customers using the PA;
- stopping trains in an emergency;
- switching off traction current in an emergency;
- keeping the service controller advised of the situation at the station; and
- reporting any incidents to the duty manager.

The duty station manager, service manager, service controller and network control centre will also have been made aware that the station has no supervisor available to deal with any incidents so will be in a position to mobilise assistance quickly if required. On a positive note for the group, general coverage is expected to improve as staff return from leave and sickness levels decrease.

## **40918 Staff not following protocol during emergency**

CIRAS has received a report about poor communication and perceived lack of protocol during emergencies at Liverpool Street station. The reporter is concerned about incidents where the platforms have to be evacuated and the police contacted.

The reporter believes that during such instances:

- no clear chain of command is established;
- staff re-open the platforms to passengers before receiving clearance from the police to do so; and
- not all members of staff are always aware that platforms have been re-opened.

The reporter is concerned that if protocol is forgotten or ignored from time to time then staff could forget an important aspect of the procedure during an emergency. Could LUL remind staff that protocol during emergencies should be followed and that clear communication is essential?

## Response from LUL

It is believed the incident being referred to is one that occurred at Liverpool Street station in December 2009. Since this incident all staff have been briefed in regards to the emergency procedures and shown the communications methods used.

A local monitoring program of safety critical communications is also in place to ensure that correct radio protocol is used.

## 40899 Staff working 'excessive' consecutive shifts

A reporter is concerned about staff from recruitment agency, Morson International, working a large number of consecutive shifts. The reporter is aware of some staff working up to and over 20 consecutive shifts before receiving a 24 hour rest period. Staff are carrying out safety critical work and the reporter is concerned that an accident may happen on-site due to someone being fatigued. In accordance with the *Working Time Directive (2003)* staff are entitled to 24 hours uninterrupted rest each week or 48 hours each fortnight. The reporter believes that staff are being rostered to work these 'excessive' shifts and therefore the rosters will show this.

Morson International staff carry out work on both Network Rail and LUL infrastructure.

For Morson International:

Could Morson International investigate the above to ensure that the number of shifts being worked by staff complies with the *Working Time Directive (2003)*?

For Network Rail and LUL:

The reporter would like both companies carry out an audit on Morson International, could this be done?

## Response from LUL

LUL employ Morson as a protection supplier and as part of the contract they have a duty to ensure that their company "*Hours of Work*" policy is adhered to. Investigations have identified this monitoring of individual hours/shifts was not followed.

Morson have since implemented a number of checks to ensure compliance with LUL *QUENSH* and NR standards such as; timesheets, weekly assignment sheets, a Morson internal audit programme which will focus on the *Working Time Policy* (a copy of which has been posted on the companies Intranet).

Ad-hoc checks will be undertaken by LUL management to ensure compliance with the requirements of *QUENSH* and NR standards, and also to check against the recommendations made by Morson in response to the CIRAS report.

## Response from Morson International

Morson would like to thank CIRAS and the reporter for bringing this issue to our attention and confirm that allegations of this nature are taken very seriously and are always investigated as thoroughly as possible.

I am pleased to report that in general, the timesheets scrutinised confirmed that the Morson policy setting out the *Working Time Directive* have been observed.

The investigation did highlight a small number of cases where the hours claimed or the number of shifts recorded did exceed the requirements within the Network Rail department. It was also highlighted that within our organisation, a certain individual who was managing the NR department had been unprofessional. As a result of this investigation, we have changed management personnel; all the sponsored NR operatives have signed the '*Morson Hours of Work Policy*'. A tool box talk has been issued (ref. 1:20) to the operatives (and signed for) that in one section reminded the NR operatives that they could only work 13 consecutive shifts (prior to this being signed off/sanctioned by senior management).

In addition, the following remedial actions have been undertaken or are in progress:

- *Morson's Hours of Work Policy* updated to include the requirements of QUENSH sec 20.1.2 and NR standards;
- a copy of the *Working Time Policy* posted on our company Intranet and issued to ALL sponsored operatives;
- implemented a weekly assignment sheet to capture the shift patterns planned;
- this sheet will also record a weekly summary of hours worked which includes shift patterns, hours worked and travel time;
- exceedance reports will be generated and reviewed/discussed on a periodic basis;
- shift managers will be informed of trends in excessive working so that action can be taken where necessary; and
- Morson internal audit programme will give particular focus to compliance with the working time policy.