

LUL and sub-LUL sector reports and responses Periods 13 and 1

Period: 07/03/10 to 01/05/10			
Prepared by	S. Beevor	Date of Version	10/05/2010
Checked by	B. Wright	Final Version	1.0

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40957 Stations in the High Barnet group left unmanned

A reporter is concerned about numerous stations in the High Barnet group on the Northern line, being left unmanned. The reporter comments that when stations are short staffed, such as when someone is on leave, some stations in this group are simply not staffed to ensure that other stations are covered. It is believed that this poses a risk to passengers as in the event of an emergency a member of staff is not present to give assistance.

The reporter understands that this issue has been raised on numerous occasions at different meetings but feels as though it has not been resolved satisfactorily. Could LUL comment on:

- staffing levels within this particular group of stations;
- any procedures in place to ensure the safety of passengers when stations are left unmanned?

Additional information:

This report is similar to report 40906 about under staffing at other station groups on the same line.

Response from LUL

Staffing every station throughout the day is a fundamental part of our service and will continue to be so. Sometimes, due to a combination of circumstances that include sickness and annual leave we are unable to achieve this and have to put contingency arrangements in place. The circumstances may be compounded if the group have vacancies, and the restrictions on overtime may mean that we are not able to cover every duty. Managers will then review cover against available staff and this includes prioritising those stations that can be left unmanned if necessary.

Before a station is left unmanned, the Group Station Manager (GSM) and their teams will consider whether there are other Station Supervisors within the station group available or, if none are available, whether there are any other station staff who are competent and familiarised to carry out the role of a Station Supervisor. These staff can be moved around the group to ensure that the larger or key stations are kept open.

LUL Rule book 11 Section 8.2 makes provision for surface stations to be unmanned, and gives clear instructions as to which activities must not be carried out and those that can be by any remaining staff, who are appropriately licensed and familiarised. Duties that can be carried out by staff if a Station Supervisor is not present which specifically ensure customer safety include:

- evacuating the station in an emergency;
- giving information to customers using the PA;
- stopping trains in an emergency;
- switching off traction current in an emergency;
- keeping the Service Controller advised of the situation at the station;
- reporting any incidents to the Duty Manager.

The Duty Station Manager, Service Manager, Service Controller and network control centre will also have been made aware that the station has no Supervisor available to deal with any incidents so will be in a position to mobilise assistance quickly if required. If a station is without a Supervisor, the Duty Station Manager will make regular visits to ensure all is in order. There are established lines of communication within the groups (radio, auto phone) and procedures in place that an adjacent Supervisor or a Duty Station Manager will be informed immediately should a situation arise when a Supervisor is no longer available.

40961 Reporting safety concerns and communications problems

A reporter has contacted CIRAS with concerns about staff feeling unable to report accidents or incidents at work through fear of losing their jobs. Although specific details cannot be fed back due to confidentiality reasons, the reporter cites incidents occurring when the Site Person in Charge (SPC) or another manager has not recorded in accident logbooks as required. Although staff are advised to report any incident that occurs on site, the issues have been dismissed and not followed up by management.

When these matters have been pursued by staff, management have apparently made staff feel victimised. This has resulted in staff fearing they would lose their job if any further safety concerns are brought up; this is particularly the case when staff have been recruited via an agency.

Another issue the reporter would like to highlight is the communication barrier between staff caused by the poor understanding of English. The reporter is aware of some staff being unable to read, write or speak English at a proficient level. For instance, this has resulted in staff continuing to work despite being told that they were in an emergency situation.

Could Tube Lines provide comments on the above issues and also address the following:

- what processes are in place to ensure all accidents and incidents that occur on site are recorded by managers and followed up appropriately;
- do Tube Lines assess staff proficiency in English? If so, does this also apply to staff who are recruited through an agency?

Response from Tube Lines

Being safe is one of Tube Lines core values. Health and Safety Focus weeks and interactive sessions are held with our work teams where they are encouraged to raise health and safety concerns so that they can be addressed. We also have in place a structured health and safety committee where staff representatives and managers meet to discuss health and safety issues and agree remedial actions. Incident reporting is encouraged across the company.

Also all reported incidents are monitored and analysed at the highest level in the company and at the weekly executive meeting. Apart from this weekly monitoring a series of campaigns and tool box talks have been used to encourage reporting of all incidents. Tube Lines is not aware of any incidents as raised by the reporter however a business wide alert will be created and issued in the next few weeks to reinforce the message.

It is mandatory for all staff or contractors working for Tube Lines to attend and pass a Tube Lines Health, Safety and Environment induction course lasting half a day. The course is delivered in English and there is an assessment test at the end. The trainers are requested to be alert to any attendees who's first language is not English, and to raise any concerns directly with the Training Manager. The *Cat 1. LUL QUENSH Standard* that all contractors have to comply with stipulates that all safety critical staff need to be able to communicate in English to a given standard. A training package to advance safety critical communications competence is currently being developed by Tube Lines in partnership with LUL.

40932 Checks not being made on platform closure boards

A reporter is concerned that staff are not checking that the lights are working on platform closure boards during the station walk. It is believed that these boards, along with other safety equipment, are meant to be checked once a week on the daily station walk.

The reporter has noticed that closure boards on platforms have flashing lights which appear to be defective. The lights are on the boards to direct the driver's attention to the fact that the platform is closed, and therefore not allow passengers to alight there. Therefore the reporter believes it to be important that the lights are working. This is perceived to be a problem at Aldgate, Liverpool Street and Moorgate stations. Could LUL:

- ensure that checks are being made on such safety equipment during the station walk;
- repair any lights that are found to be defective?

Response from LUL

Thank you for raising this report. There is a programme in place to check platform closure boards as part of the weekly emergency equipment checks conducted by the Station Supervisor for each station on the group. The forms are then signed by the Station Supervisor who has conducted the check, and faxed across to the Duty Station Manager's office.

A review of recent check forms was carried out in January 2010. It was identified that all deficiencies were being rectified.

40941 Loose windows on Class 92 tube train stock 'need assessing'

A reporter is worried by the number of loose fitting windows being discovered on Class 92 stock tube trains (92TS) on the Central line. Many of these windows can actually be moved in their frames by hand, and the fear is that a sudden jolt could make them fall out. Apart from being a safety risk, such windows are liable to leak water and cause passengers discomfort.

Though the windows are tested with a purpose-made gauge, this is believed to be inadequate because windows that officially pass the test still shake in their frames. The reporter is under the impression that there is a large volume of windows that need assessing, potentially presenting a large, unquantified safety risk which has the potential to cause an accident.

The reporter would like LUL to:

- discuss this issue openly so the risk can be addressed;
- review the accuracy of the gauge and the way it is currently being used;
- quantify the actual number of windows that still need assessing;
- act on any that require maintenance.

Response from LUL

We would like to thank the enquirer for bringing this matter to our attention. The Central line 92TS consists of 340 units. Each unit is made up of two cars with six body side saloon windows per car. This equates to a total of 4080 saloon windows.

The saloon windows are flush fitted, frameless, toughened glass bonded to the outside of the aluminium carbody which forms the window aperture. This method of fitment is designed to form a water sealed fixing, finished with a sealant 'finger finish' visible edge (Fig No.1).




Fig 1. External view of saloon window

Historically, the fleet has had problems with this sealed fixing with water ingress caused by corrosion of the aluminium in the area surrounding the body side saloon windows. A saloon window found with this defect (commonly referred to as 'loose') is one that shows signs of excessive movement when tested.

To contain the problem all windows are checked on a three monthly basis using a tool that applies a known and predetermined force to the window to detect excessive movement. This test is conducted in accordance with an approved process by specially trained maintenance staff. Due to concerns raised by those carrying out the window testing, an independent check is also being carried out with a calibrated digital force meter to assure the validity of results obtained through using the standard 'window push tester'. As of 9 March 2010 this independent check has completed 65% of the fleet with similar results to those obtained through using the push tester. Fleet maintenance instructions specify that any window showing movement, detected by this tool, must be repaired before allowing the car to be entered into service.

Any cars found to have defective windows are subjected to remedial works carried out by a specialist glazing company against an appropriate and approved repair procedure. Having obtained the results of the independent check carried out using the digital force meter for the whole fleet, a review will be conducted to compare the results of both tests to confirm whether or not the mitigating routine maintenance activities remain acceptable. If this review identifies any inadequacies with the current maintenance practices, appropriate corrective action will be undertaken.

40969 Palace Street slip, trip and fall hazards on Victoria line

A reporter is concerned about slip, trip and fall hazards in a mid-tunnel ventilation shaft area for the Victoria line at Palace Street. The site is managed by Mansell.

The access from the garage via the rear stairs to the pump room is completely blocked with compressors and large ventilation ducts. In another area, leading from surface level down to the shaft, there are other potential hazards. Old wall-mounted switch gear boxes have leads protruding at face level, posing an injury risk to workers passing by. Duct work has been added to an area - which is already untidy - and is consequently being squashed, compromising the air supply to the areas it serves. The reporter says the situation has deteriorated over the last month. It is suggested the site be cleaned up in general, ensuring

adequate room for individuals to access all the relevant workspaces – could this be arranged?

Response from LUL

London Underground's *Cooling the Tube Programme (CTP)* is undertaking major construction works to upgrade the permanent ventilation fan at Palace Street Mid-Tunnel Ventilation (MTV) shaft. LUL has appointed Mansell as the principal contractor under the CDM regulations for the project; and they have responsibility for safety on site. The LUL Project Team maintains an overview of site activities, in accordance with the CDM client role.

The space available at the site is extremely limited. This has been recognised by the LUL and Mansell teams; and works are being carefully sequenced to ensure that safe access and egress routes are available at all times, and a safe working environment exists within the shaft, both for contractors and ongoing maintenance of key LUL installations.

In order to ensure the safety of site personnel, and to allow works to take place during railway operational hours, the shaft has been segregated from the railway by the construction of a physical barrier at the foot of the shaft. This means that when works take place below ground it is necessary to provide a system of forced ventilation into the shaft, which requires a fan near the exit to atmosphere and a flexible duct within the shaft. These further restrict the already constricted nature of the site. When works take place below ground the ventilation system impairs the normal access through the rear garage door and stairs; so an alternative access route to the pump room below is provided. Currently, the alternative route through the fan room and basement is blocked with plates over the stairs and beams in the basement; so the ventilation ducts have been set aside to enable access through the garage.

It is a requirement that anybody who enters the site is given a thorough briefing by Mansell's appointed person, before the start of any shift. This briefing describes the current arrangements and safe access and egress routes. Part of Mansell's scope is to remove old and redundant equipment. This includes old wall mounted switch gear boxes. LUL's recent inspection of the site found no protruding leads at face level; however, discussions have been held with Mansell to ensure that the site is kept clean and that cables are adequately clipped and tidied even during removal of equipment. This will require constant vigilance by all staff.

The report mentions that part of the ventilation duct has been squashed. The maintenance of a clear air path is essential when the system is in use; however, as indicated above, the ventilation system is only operational when personnel need to access the shaft. When the system is re-activated, the duct will inflate and no loss of supply is expected. Mansell undertake regular inspections of the ductwork and flow rate when the air supply system is operational.

The works on site over the past month have necessitated a number of changes to access and egress routes in order that the works are progressed. The site is regularly inspected by LUL and Mansell staff to ensure an acceptable standard is maintained, however it is possible that, on occasions, issues such as these raised in the report have arisen. Any issues are rectified as soon as they are brought to the attention of site management. LUL and Mansell are committed to ensuring safety on this and all sites, and we are grateful to the reporter for bringing it to our attention.

40899 Staff working 'excessive' consecutive shifts

A reporter is concerned about staff from a recruitment agency working a large number of consecutive shifts. The reporter is aware of some staff working up to and over 20 consecutive shifts before receiving a 24 hour rest period. Staff are carrying out safety critical work and the reporter is concerned that an accident may happen on site due to someone being fatigued. In accordance with the *Working Time Directive (2003)* staff are entitled to 24 hours uninterrupted rest each week or 48 hours each fortnight. The reporter believes that staff are being rostered to work these 'excessive' shifts and therefore the rosters will show this. These agency staff carry out work on both Network Rail and LUL infrastructure.

For Network Rail and LUL:

- the reporter would like both companies to carry out an audit on this recruitment agency. Could this be done?;

Response from Network Rail

Network Rail would like to thank the reporter for bringing their concerns to our attention, however, unless more specific information can be provided; approaching this recruitment agency directly to instigate an audit without supporting evidence would be difficult.

Network Rail does not issue an operating license for the labour supply company in question. In circumstances such as these Network Rail rely on those who issue the service providers with their licence i.e. Achilles to monitor and audit their members.

Achilles issue link-up acceptance and regularly audit their members under a strict regime. Achilles completed an audit of this recruitment agency last year but found no inconsistencies. The auditor confirmed that after the audit this company had an *Hours of Work Policy*, the contents of the document was satisfactory, and that arrangements in place satisfied industry requirements. So, with specific information Network Rail would be in a better position to directly contact this agency to investigate further.

Response from Recruitment Agency

We would like to thank CIRAS and the reporter for bringing this issue to our attention and confirm that allegations of this nature are taken very seriously and are always investigated as thoroughly as possible. I am pleased to report that in general, the timesheets scrutinised confirmed that our policy setting out the *Working Time Directive* has been observed.

The investigation did highlight a small number of cases where the hours claimed or the number of shifts recorded did exceed the requirements within the Network Rail department. It was also highlighted that within our organisation, a certain individual who was managing the Network Rail department had been unprofessional. As a result of this investigation we have changed management personnel; all the sponsored Network Rail operatives have signed the company's *Hours of Work Policy*. A tool box talk has been issued to the operatives (and signed for) in one section reminded the Network Rail operatives that they could only work 13 consecutive shifts (prior to this being signed off/sanctioned by senior management).

In addition, the following remedial actions have been undertaken or are in progress:

- Company *Hours of Work Policy* updated to include the requirements of *QUENSH sec 20.1.2* and Network Rail standards;
- a copy of the *Working Time Policy* posted on our company intranet and issued to ALL sponsored operatives;
- implemented a weekly assignment sheet to capture the shift patterns planned;

- this sheet will also record a weekly summary of hours worked which includes shift patterns, hours worked and travel time;
- exceedance reports will be generated and reviewed/discussed on a periodic basis;
- Shift Managers will be informed of trends in excessive working so that action can be taken where necessary;
- our internal audit programme will give particular focus to compliance with the working time policy.

Response from LUL

LUL employ this recruitment agency as a protection supplier and as part of the contract they have a duty to ensure that their company *Hours of Work* policy is adhered to. Investigations have identified the monitoring of individual hours/shifts was not followed. The agency have since implemented a number of checks to ensure compliance with LUL *QUENSH* and Network Rail standards such as timesheets, weekly assignment sheets and an internal audit programme which will focus on the *Working Time Policy* which has been posted on the company's intranet.

Ad-hoc checks will be undertaken by LUL management to ensure compliance with the requirements of *QUENSH* and Network Rail standards and also to check against the recommendations made by the recruitment agency in response to the CIRAS report.

40996 Poor conditions at Neasden depot not improved

A reporter has contacted CIRAS with a concern about the working conditions at Neasden depot. The roof along roads 30 to 37 has been leaking for years, causing puddles to form on the floor within the depot. This presents a slipping hazard for staff working around live trains and equipment.

Although some mitigation measures are in place, the reporter comments that puddles are not cleared promptly enough. This is mainly due to staff having to find members of the cleaning team to report the puddles to. It is suggested that after periods of rainfall, cleaning staff are instructed to check for puddles and clear any they find without staff having to report them first. Is this possible?

The leaking roof was subject to a previous CIRAS report (40683) in March 2009. When responding previously LUL stated, "*a recent roof survey concluded that a full new roof needs to be fitted... this refurbishment is due to start on or around August 2009*". Although refurbishment works are currently being carried out at the depot the reporter is under the impression that the roof will no longer be replaced and is unsure what remedial works, if any, will be carried out. Could LUL please comment on the current situation regarding the roof at Neasden depot?

Response from LUL

The initial date for the completion of the works at Neasden was delayed due to a number of organisational issues at the time. This was communicated to all staff. As of the 8 March 2010 the exam shed at Neasden has been closed to all maintenance staff and refurbishment commenced, which includes fixing the roof. The works are expected to be completed by August 2010.

40983 Procedure used to remove asbestos

A reporter has contacted CIRAS querying the procedures in place for asbestos removal. The reporter is under the impression that areas where asbestos is being removed should be sealed and thoroughly cleaned afterwards. Also that staff should be made aware of any removal works taking place.

Could LUL answer the following:

- what procedures are set out in the LUL *Rule Book* for asbestos removal;
- how are contamination levels of asbestos measured;
- where can staff access any information they are entitled to regarding the asbestos removal, such as a method statement;
- should any notice be given in advance to staff who are working whilst the removal of asbestos is occurring?

Response from LUL

1. *What procedures are set out in the LUL Rule Book for asbestos removal?*

LUL Cat 1 Standard, 1-130 *Management of Hazardous Materials – Asbestos Containing Materials (ACMs)* defines the requirements for the asbestos registration within London Underground premises and sets out the duty holder, as defined by *Control of Asbestos Regulations 2006*, for each of the suppliers who manage our premises.

There is a formal procedure, *Mr-Pr-10026 A3 Control of Asbestos* to be followed before any works commence within stations. This applies where the premises are maintained by LUL Nominee Company SSL or LUL Nominee Company BCV. For stations maintained by Tube Lines Ltd there is a procedure owned and managed by them.

2. *How are contamination levels of asbestos measured?*

Contamination occurs when an ACM is damaged in such a way that respirable asbestos fibres are released into the atmosphere. Should this occur, or the occurrence is suspected, then it should be reported as a fault. There is a tested regime that covers such situations and includes reassurance air tests commissioned from a UKAS accredited asbestos consultancy. A contractor, licensed by the HSE to work with asbestos, will carry out a decontamination process until it can be proved that the levels of airborne fibres are below the legislative levels.

3. *Where can staff access any information they are entitled to regarding the asbestos removal, such as a method statement?*

The LUL *Asbestos Register* is available at every station via the Station Supervisor's computer and is available on the LUL network. This information is also available to contractors, by requesting the *Asbestos Register* from the Station Supervisor, this should have had this information before they get to site.

4. *Should any notice be given in advance to staff who are working whilst the removal of asbestos is occurring?*

If an area is deemed unsafe it will be sealed and staff briefed to prevent them from accessing the area. Major works that incorporate a large amount of asbestos work will be planned in advance and the staff will be briefed.

There may be occasions when asbestos is discovered accidentally. In this situation there will have been no prior briefing of staff and the incident will be resolved as described under "*how are contamination levels of asbestos measured?*" above.

40968 Health and safety concerns on site at Warren Street

CIRAS has received a report concerning a site at Warren Street station. The reporter comments that general health and safety at the site is poor, with *QUENCH* guidelines not always being followed and highlights a number of persistent issues, including the following:

- mess facilities – the reporter comments that mess areas are being used as storage rooms instead of their intended purpose, leaving staff with little room to take breaks;
- Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) supplies – in particular there is a shortage of eye protection and task specific gloves. According to the reporter staff alert management when supplies are running low but shortages still occur;
- Portable Appliance Testing (PAT) – according to the reporter the site was required to be PAT tested in early January but this is still to happen;
- hand towels – there is a shortage of materials for staff to dry their hands after washing them. This is a common occurrence and any supplies of hand towels provided to the site only last a few days;
- certification – the reporter also believes that some subcontracting staff may not hold the correct certification for work they are carrying out.

Could Vinci Construction comment on:

- all of the above issues, ensuring that facilities and equipment are provided and testing carried out;
- the health and safety procedures in place at the site, ensuring that monitoring is undertaken to check that procedures are being followed.

Response from Vinci Construction UK

VINCI Construction UK (VCUK) would like to thank you for bringing these items to our attention. VCUK are fully committed to providing a safe working environment to all our staff and contractors and review our processes regularly to ensure all risks are assessed and issues in regard to welfare are resolved at the lowest practicable level. The following comments clarify our processes and controls in place at Warren Street that are kept under review:

- Mess facilities - safety tours and planned general Inspections are undertaken of the whole site of works and welfare facilities on a regular basis no less than once every four week period. In January 2010 the issue of storing of materials was first raised via a management safety tour, where materials were found within the mess facility. This occurrence was dealt with by the site team immediately and all materials were removed. Since January further monitoring by the Compound Supervisor is taking place. Some very minor issues of operatives leaving or taking materials into the mess room have occurred and have been addressed at the time by the compound supervisor. All operatives on site are given tool box talks and worksite briefings with an emphasis on correct storage. The compound supervisor continues to monitor the situation to ensure this situation does not reoccur. Storage on projects is covered by the London Underground storage requirements, which are detailed in *London Underground's Category 1 Standard – Quality, Environmental, Safety and Health (QUENSH)*.
- Shortages of PPE supplies - all staff and contractors are to be supplied with PPE, identified by the method statement and risk assessment, by their own company, for the task undertaken. Additional PPE is stored on site for staff and contractors if their own company has not provided the necessary PPE. No staff member or contractor is allowed to work without sufficient PPE for the task. This is checked on a shift basis by the site person in charge in addition to being the individual's responsibility to wear appropriate PPE. This process is also supplemented by planned general inspection

and management safety tours. We regularly replenish the stock order which is supplied to site. A delay had occurred to a PPE order where stock was running low, however the last delivery was on the 19 March and we are continuing to review our stock level and replenish on a regular basis by establishing triggers in our ordering process.

An example of the tool box talk given to all operatives regarding PPE is as follows:

ENSURE YOU HAVE THE CORRECT PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)

The *Health and Safety at Work Act 1974* stipulates that an employer is required to pay for equipment for the health, safety and welfare of their employee.

A risk assessment identifies what PPE is required during a work activity. This may include items such as: Safety Boots; Hi-Vi; Hard Hat; Safety Eyewear; Dust Masks; Gloves; Ear Defenders; and Respiratory Apparatus/Masks.

Do's	Don'ts
<p>YOUR RESPONSIBILITIES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Ensure that your PPE is compatible e.g. ear defenders with hard hats ✓ Ensure that all PPE is regularly inspected particularly prior to starting work. <p>Should you lose or damage any or your PPE make sure that you inform your supervisor.</p>	<p>NEVER CONTINUE TO USE DAMAGED PPE!</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✗ You should remember that as an employee you have a legal duty to use PPE in accordance with the training supplied by the employer and all issued PPE must be documented and signed as received. ✗ You must ensure that you do not tamper with or misuse the PPE supplied to you by your employer – IT IS ILLEGAL TO DO SO! ✗ When your PPE is not used ensure that it is stored in a designated storage area provided by your employer.

Questions asked by the site person in charge to ensure understanding of the requirements:

1. Why should you wear PPE?
 2. Who should pay for your PPE?
 3. Prior to starting any work what should do regarding PPE?
 4. If you find your PPE is damaged what should you ensure you do?
 5. What is your legal obligation regarding PPE?
 6. Where should you store your PPE?
- PAT testing - We reiterate through our method statements and toolbox talks that equipment should only be used if it is free from defect and has an in date testing certificate. This is then further re-inforced by the site induction and the London Underground safety induction of suppliers course (or its replacement the LUA-CAS induction courses) which are mandatory. We further inform all our staff and contractors that they are to check all equipment at the beginning of their shift.

The project has provided a suitable certified electrician to the project who undertook the PAT testing to support the process; unfortunately this person has recently left the project. The project Electrical Contractor has now conducted the testing on the entire

site to provide confidence that all equipment has been tested, this was completed on the weekend of 10 and 11 April 2010. Additionally the project continues to remind all staff and contractors via tool box talks that only equipment that is fit for use is to be utilised and if any operative discovers a piece of equipment not fit-for-use it is to be reported to their supervisor and removed from site at the earliest opportunity. An example of the tool box talk given to all operatives is as follows:

ACCIDENT PREVENTION

Causes of accidents:

- people not thinking about what they are doing or following instructions;
- people not following training they have been given and ignoring safety signals, signs and warning devices;
- unsafe manual handling, loading, stacking and storing;
- overloading of working places, scaffolding and hoists etc;
- incorrect use of plant and machinery or use of faulty equipment with improvised repairs;
- illegal removal of guards and barriers or failure to use protective safety equipment.

The cost of accidents to you:

- pain, suffering and continuing disability;
- loss of earnings and extra expense due to disability;
- incapacity for the job and your leisure activities;
- unable to support family and possible family break-up.

Accident prevention:

- wear and use PPE correctly, do not abuse it;
- help to keep the workplace clean and tidy;
- never use defective equipment or machinery or remove guards from machines;
- do not handle substances without knowing the hazards;
- do not use machines if not trained and always follow instructions;
- always comply with safe working practices and obey all safety rules and signs;
- do not direct compressed air at yourself or others, it kills;
- never mess around at work and report unsafe conditions to your supervisor.
- wash and dry hands to remove substances from skin;
- use correct tools and equipment for the job and do not leave tools lying about where they can harm.

Questions.

1. How could an accident to you affect your family?
 2. What is a cause of accidents in working places?
 3. What could the cost of an accident be to you?
 4. If you saw an unsafe condition what would you do?
- Hand towels – site consumables were ordered on a local basis by the project due to internal LUL ordering difficulties. However, moving forward on the project, and to ensure sufficient stocks of consumables are maintained and do not fall to a low level, central orders, via LUL Nominee BCV, have been set up to conduct regular deliveries which will be supplemented if required locally. The first of these deliveries arrived on 19 March. We will continue to keep this under review and increase our regular order if appropriate.

- Certification – a robust certification system is in place that is checked on a shift basis in addition to all certification being checked and photo copied on first induction to the site. Periodical checks are undertaken by the project team to ensure that the process is being adhered to. However, although we are confident that the processes in place provide us with the assurance that all operatives are suitably certificated and qualified to undertake any role for which they are employed, we have undertaken a separate investigation. The findings of the investigation have confirmed that all operatives are competent and have the correct valid certification which in turn confirmed our current process is working effectively.

We will continue to be vigilant in this regard, welcoming and encouraging our staff and contractors to report to the site person in charge or their supervisor any person they may suspect of not holding valid certificates or licences.

Once again I would like to thank you for bringing these issues to our attention. Conducting the investigation in regard to these issues has greatly assisted us in reviewing how well our systems and processes are operating and how they can be improved.

Although all the issues raised were already known to us and therefore had been or were being addressed when we received the report, being brought to our attention has greatly assisted in reinforcing the message at management, supervisory and operative levels to be vigilant and proactive at all times with regards to the health, safety and wellbeing of themselves and others.

40958 Agency staff fear losing their job when they report a H&S incident

A reporter has raised concerns about agency staff feeling unable to raise health and safety incidents for fear of losing their job when working on Balfour Beatty Rail managed sites.

The reporter is aware of numerous incidents occurring on sites whereby management have dismissed the severity of an injury or incident, failed to record the issue in the accident log book and told staff to continue working. The reporter believes that on occasions when an accident has occurred, the individual's treatment for injuries was not taken seriously by management. The reporter felt that this has the potential to generate an intimidating atmosphere about reporting incidents or accidents. The reporter believes that managers are more concerned about time and resources lost due to a member of staff taking time off rather than looking after their workforce's safety.

The reporter suggests management re-training is required to ensure current health and safety guidelines are adhered to and that staff are able to raise health and safety incidents without fear of losing their job. Please comment.

Please note: site and incident information has not been included for confidentiality reasons.

Response from Balfour Beatty Rail

We thank the reporter for bringing this matter to our attention. The health and safety of all our people is essential to us, and as part of this, we continue to encourage the reporting of every accident or incident to help us learn to improve the way we work more safely. All reported accidents and incidents are discussed by senior management at a fortnightly safety conference call in order that lessons are learnt and the necessary control measures are put in place to prevent reoccurrence.

An *Accident or Incident report form* is completed for every incident and dealt with by the management team. If a member of our site management team choose not to report an incident this would be treated most seriously through our disciplinary procedure. Balfour Beatty Rail staff and contractors can use the established '*refusal to work on grounds of health and safety*' procedure if an individual believes that they are being asked to work unsafely, and where this is exercised, we will always fully support the individual and investigate the matter.

As part of our drive to achieve zero harm we have implemented ideas which enable individuals to communicate any safety concerns that they may have through an alternative route other than their line manager or site supervisor, if required. SHEQ surgeries are held by dedicated night SHEQ advisers, so that individuals can openly discuss any issues they may have on a one to one confidential basis. We also have an anonymous '*what's wrong*' form which can be posted confidentially into SHEQ letterboxes so that the issue(s) raised can be investigated and fed back to the workforce.

The Balfour Beatty drive for zero harm has been so designed to think differently about what we do to eliminate fatal risks and the risk of harm to all our people. We place a very strong emphasis on the immediate reporting of all accidents and incidents. We do not tolerate our people being bullied or victimised. Where such instances are brought to our attention they are rigorously investigated and appropriate action taken, including dismissal of individuals where appropriate.

It must be emphasised that training is an essential part of our staff development. We continue to undertake a significant level of training and as part of our supervisor development they attend the BB Rail Supervisor Development Programme which is recognised by the Institute of Leadership and Management and also attend the three day IOSH accredited *BB Rail Essential Health and Safety Awareness* training course.