

LUL and sub-LUL sector reports and responses

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Contents

40830 SS1 cover 'inadequate' on Jubilee line.....	3
40760 Alarm for earth defects repeatedly cancelled	4
40779 Safety issues for weekend possession at Westbourne Park.....	4
40848 Untrained staff handling safety critical calls.....	6
40794 & 40814 Pigeon problem on DLR platform at Canning Town station ...	6
40862 LUL driver calls to NR signaller 'go unanswered'	7

40830 SS1 cover 'inadequate' on Jubilee line

Station supervisor cover for large, interchange stations on the Jubilee line is a concern for a reporter. The reporter believes that there is a tendency to use station supervisors with the station supervisor two (SS2) level of competence when, in fact, SS1 cover is required. Before a station supervisor is deemed competent enough to cover an SS1 position at one of the interchange stations, he or she would normally accumulate a considerable amount of experience at one of the smaller stations. From time to time, this requirement is being circumvented and the reporter fears that it may become a habit, especially in periods of annual leave or sickness. In particular, SS2 level supervisors will not have the necessary crowd management experience to deal with situations at busier SS1 stations, and may react less appropriately.

The reporter would like to see interchange stations have the required SS1 cover at all times. Is it possible to stop the practice of allowing SS2 cover for SS1 designated stations?

Please comment.

Response from LUL

The report was investigated by the station performance manager; the investigation found no evidence of staff members working at interchange stations on the Jubilee line without the appropriate operational licence to do so.

The grade as which a station supervisor is able to work at a specific station is determined by the level of operational licence held by the individual supervisor. A station supervisor competent to SS1 licences for working at a SS1 station, SS2 licence for working at a SS2 station. The level of licence required to work at specific station is based on factors such as the size and complexity of the station.

Where a station is listed as supervisor one (SS1), only supervisors who are trained, qualified, competent and in possession of a valid SS1 licence, are able to work at such locations. The difference between a SS1 and a SS2 is an enhanced interview, an assessment on control room operation and six months experience supervising stations (of any level).

One option for SS2 to progress to SS1 is to undertake and successfully complete the training for SS1. Following successful completion of the training which is signed off by operational learning, an SS2 may remain in their current role while waiting for a "nomination" or vacancy for SS1 position.

Licensed and competent SS2 can be use to cover SS1 roles providing the following:

- the individual is an experienced SS2;
- they have successfully achieved the required licence for SS1 duties;
- they have completed the training, demonstrated the required competencies and are in receipt of a valid SS1 licence; and
- they have gained adequate experience and knowledge of the location.

40760 Alarm for earth defects repeatedly cancelled

A reporter is concerned that the traction earth detection equipment has been picking up traction earth defects when trains enter and exit on section 10 at Northfields and Ealing Common depots and section 44 at Cockfosters depot for some time.

The correct procedure when a genuine earth defect is identified is for staff to cancel the alarm in the control room, refer to the traction earth detection diagrams and then contact Leicester Square substation control room. However, defects are being picked up as much as 15 times a day. This is leading to staff cancelling the alarm and referring to the diagram to check that a train is in the section because it is felt that the earth defect is not genuine.

This is raising concerns that if the traction earth detection equipment at these locations is not fixed that it could lead to staff becoming complacent and cancelling the alarm when there is in fact a genuine earth defect that needs to be addressed. The reporter feels that this is compromising the seriousness and effectiveness of the equipment.

According to the reporter, if an actual earth is not dealt with correctly that it could potentially lead to an explosion. The reporter would like Tube Lines to investigate these faults to find out the cause and then take the necessary action to fix them.

Additional information

These faults have been reported through the fault report centre on many different occasions and still no action appears to have been taken.

Joint response from LUL and Tube Lines

The traction earth detection (TED) system located in the line controller's office will show very short duration earth faults when a train crosses over a sectionalisation gap of less than 15m. For this reason the TED system has an alarm delay switch which should be switched on (this introduces a three second delay before alarming). This switch should only be switched off when the line controller is locating a known fault. It was found that this switch was in the off position which resulted in lots of nuisance alarms. Having switched this on these nuisance alarms have stopped.

40779 Safety issues for weekend possession at Westbourne Park

Several different safety concerns have been raised following a possession at Westbourne Park station during the weekend of 13-14 June. The reporter has questioned several of Enterprise's work practices and highlights the following points:

- station security was a main concern. It is felt little attention was paid to security during the possession (and as a result workers were potentially exposed to the risk of assault);
- there was one sign-in sheet with the Enterprise logo provided at the start of the shift – but no further briefing on the local area was provided. In the event of a fire, workers may not have been aware of their evacuation points;
- safety glasses were not worn by machine operators. The reporter questions whether staff were being asked to wear PPE; and
- workers received one break of 30 minutes eight hours into a 12 hour shift. The 'Working Time Directive 2003' indicates that for every six hours, a worker can expect a 20 minute break.

For LUL:

- Could LUL please clarify who is responsible for provision of station security during possessions across London Underground stations?

The reporter suggests that Enterprise could:

- provide written or verbal briefings in future, informing staff of their local area and fire evacuation points;
- ensure all staff are provided with and instructed to wear their PPE as appropriate; and
- work in line with the *Working Time Directive* to ensure that staff are receiving the appropriate breaks during their shifts.

Joint response from Enterprise and LUL

Security:

Enterprise - Additionally to the CIRAS report, it was reported through Enterprise internal hazard spotting system that on this particular weekend a cricket game was taking place and that cricket supporters were walking on one of the footbridges and were throwing glass bottles at the Enterprise working party. A potential recommendation that could be made to London Underground is that footbridges should be closed during Enterprise work. However this will cause further disturbance to residents. All Enterprise employees are briefed not to answer to provocation and to move to a place of safety when this type of incident occurs.

LUL - Security at the station is the responsibility of the station supervisor (LUL) and security beyond station access gate on the possession site is provided by the principal contractor. However this particular incident happened between stations on a foot bridge. As a result, projects shall review future security arrangements and provide temporary missile screens during future possessions.

Signing in sheet:

Enterprise is unsure about the statement made by the reporter. Signing in sheets for all shifts and for all parties involved have been retrieved. On all shifts, a gate person ensures all workers and visitors sign in and receive a briefing. All Enterprise gate persons are trained to site person in charge of safety on the track.

Safety glasses:

Machine operators are not required to wear safety glasses whilst driving road railer vehicles since there is no significant risk that could result in eye injuries. PPE requirements are described within the method statements and are risk based. PPE requirements are also part of the senior site person in charge's briefing, the project manager's briefing and the gate person's briefing.

Working Time Directive:

All Enterprise possessions are planned on 12 hour shifts with one 40 minutes break generally planned after five and a half hours to six hours. Enterprise personnel were issued with an extract of the *Working Time Directive*.

Additionally, following the CIRAS report, for each possession, the Enterprise project manager produced a break rota in accordance with the *Directive*. This rota is briefed to all personnel

prior to the possession and is displayed at the signing in point for reference for both the workforce and management.

Enterprise has in place a database whereby it is possible to identify personnel working excessive hours. Reports generated from the database are then forwarded to the relevant line manager for remedial actions. Subcontractors involved in possession have also been made aware of this arrangement.

40848 Untrained staff handling safety critical calls

A reporter is concerned about untrained staff handling safety critical calls at the control centre based at Canary Wharf. In addition, a high workload in a highly pressured environment with fewer staff is causing stress and low morale amongst staff.

The control centre handles calls about infrastructure-related problems, such as lift and escalator faults, water and electrical problems, platform and depot issues, signal failures, and track faults on London Underground's Jubilee, Northern and Piccadilly lines. Staff are required to achieve a 97 per cent call pickup rate – with every call answered within 60 seconds – otherwise Tube Lines incur penalties.

To achieve this high standard, the reporter states a full complement of trained staff is required. Although there are supposed to be a minimum of four staff rostered on during day and night shifts, there have been occasions recently when only three staff members are working which, during meal breaks, is reduced to two people operating the phones. If staff are absent due to sickness or annual leave, staff from other teams in the centre are asked to cover the roles to ensure the calls are answered promptly. But, these staff are not trained as control centre operators and only take messages for the operatives to call back, which the reporter fears could lead to a safety critical issue being misinterpreted or errors being made.

Could Tube Lines consider training other staff and comment on how the rostering situation could be improved to ensure safety critical calls are covered by trained staff?

Response from Tube Lines

A recruitment campaign is already underway with adverts for control centre staff at every level including a new control centre manager. Additional overtime has been authorised to keep levels above a minimum and no untrained staff are currently taking fault calls.

40794 & 40814 Pigeon problem on DLR platform at Canning Town station

Two reporters are concerned by pigeon excrement and feathers falling from a canopy roof at Canning Town station. The Docklands Light Railway (DLR) platform at the station has a two tier canopy roof which pigeons are nesting in between. As a result, both tiers of the roof are covered in pigeon excrement and feathers, which falls onto both the platform and down a shaft onto London Underground property. The reporters feel the extent of the excrement, which has been estimated to be ten year's worth, causes a health hazard to staff working regularly nearby.

Could DLR please comment on an action plan to clean the affected areas and prevent pigeons nesting in the canopy roof in the future?

Response from DLR

The Docklands Light Railway would like to thank the reporters for bringing this matter to our attention. After investigation, the problem has arisen due to an aperture in the side of the LUL station canopy, which has allowed pigeons to enter the hollow structure.

Recent works as part of the DLR's Three Car Capacity Enhancement programme have cleaned a part of the structure, and the imminent installation of communications cables through the body of the canopy will see the remainder addressed.

After consultation with London Underground, we are presently attempting to determine what would be the most effective method of sealing the canopy to prevent repetition of the problem. Once the optimal solution has been devised, implementation works will be undertaken.

40862 LUL driver calls to NR signaller 'go unanswered'

London Underground (LUL) drivers on the Bakerloo line who need to speak over the Connect Two radio system to the Network Rail (NR) signal box at Wembley are finding that their calls sometimes go unanswered. The infrastructure, which is shared between Queens Park and Harrow and Wealdstone, is controlled by NR. The reporter says this issue has been causing some concern amongst drivers for the past six months.

Drivers may need to speak with the signaller to convey safety critical information - such as the presence of an obstruction on the line, a fire, or anything else that may require immediate action. There are electrified overhead lines carrying 25,000 volts, as well as conductor rails in this area. Though signal post telephones (SPTs) can also be used to communicate, these are not always ideally placed if there is an incident.

The reporter understands that these unanswered calls are logged somewhere by LUL, but are they being logged anywhere by NR? It is acknowledged by the reporter that the workload in the signal box may be intense at times, and that there may be other emergencies to attend to at the time of a call. It is suggested that LUL work with NR to resolve this issue. Perhaps some performance indicators could be put in place to help ensure calls are always answered promptly.

Please comment.

Response from LUL

The issue of Bakerloo line train operators calls, made on the Connect system, not being answered by the Network Rail signal box at Wembley has been, and continues to be raised with the Network Rail signal box manager by the LUL service control manager. LUL service control also maintains a log of calls missed by the Wembley signal box.

At a recent JDG meeting (held 20/11/09) between Network Rail (NR), London Underground Limited (LUL) and London Overground Rail Operations Limited (LOROL), the item was raised and discussed. Actions were agreed to ensure a full understanding of the issue. Once the root cause of the calls not being answered by the Wembley signal box is identified (i.e. technical or human factors) a plan of action to resolve will be agreed by all parties and tracked to completion.

Response from Network Rail

Network Rail would like to thank the reporter for bring their concerns to our attention. Connect Radio was installed by London Underground (LUL) 12 months ago, prior to this signal post telephones (SPTs) were used as the main form of communication between LUL driver's and the signalling staff within Wembley SCC. These are still in situ and can be used as an alternative to the Connect radio system which is maintained by LUL and not Network Rail.

From discussions between Network Rail and LUL we have identified that the situation of unanswered calls may have happened during major service disruption which caused a large volume of telephone calls.

We believe this to be no different to any other panel/workstation in a signal box which could have potentially a large amount of phone calls coming through during disruption.

With reference to the safety concerns about making emergency calls, the Connect system has a 'mayday' facility. If the driver operated the 'mayday' facility this will then cut all other Connect radio communications off and the signaller will answer the 'mayday' call immediately as per instructions and training.

We will continue to work with LUL to monitor the use of the Connect radio system to avoid as far as possible situations where calls received from driver's go unanswered. The signalling staff in Wembley SCC have all been re-briefed on the requirements to try and respond to calls as promptly as possible.