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CIRAS is a completely impartial system that provides a way for rail industry staff to report safety concerns in confidence. However, concerns about safety should be raised through company channels first, where possible.

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The CIRAS team will once again be exhibiting at the Infrarail exhibition, this year being held at the NEC in Birmingham from 13-15 April.

This is a great opportunity for you to come along and meet some of the team who will be there to answer your questions and talk to you about how the CIRAS service can benefit you and your colleagues.

You'll find CIRAS at stand 1080. We look forward to seeing many of you there. To find out other industry events CIRAS will be attending check out our website www.ciras.org.uk.


Slips, trips and falls

In the last issue of The Reporter you will have read that CIRAS has been doing a project on slips, trips and falls – always a hot topic for safety professionals. CIRAS has been reviewing its data bank to determine whether information on slips, trips and falls would support and assist rail companies. Clearly it remains a key safety issue for everyone in the industry.

Of the 600 contacts CIRAS receives each year, 11 per cent of potential events relate to slips, trips and falls. Of course, CIRAS doesn't deal with incidents that have already occurred, as it takes calls about potential safety concerns.

However, over half – 57 per cent – of the potential slips, trips and falls recorded relate to hazards on a work site or lineside, according to CIRAS data. Thirty two per cent relate to station or platform hazards and 11 per cent relate to on train hazards.

According to PSLG* data, 50 per cent of all actual accidents in the workplace are as a result of slips,



Potential slips, trips and falls as reported to CIRAS

trips and falls. This research also shows that if this statistic was reduced by just 15 per cent it would equate to saving one life a year.

Slips, trips and falls are a very real danger – one that could affect any of us in the workplace – but looking out for the signs isn't always at the forefront of

our minds. So, if you do have a concern about a potential slip, trip or fall hazard, please don't ignore it. Either speak to your manager, your company safety reporting line or CIRAS.

*PSLG is a cross industry leadership group for Network Rail infrastructure projects.



Launch of our new DVD!

Some of you may have already seen the new CIRAS DVD – a short film to let all rail staff know that CIRAS is available to take your confidential safety concerns. We hope it will be shown in company staff inductions and safety briefings.

The film, which is just over two minutes long, features real workers from across the industry. We would like to thank everyone who helped with the DVD, which is available to view on the resources page of the CIRAS website.

IN SHORT

With help from your reports to CIRAS:

- all First Capital Connect train dispatch staff received full training regarding newly adopted ALARP principles for the dispatch of HST 2+8 sets at Luton Parkway; and
- an internal memo was sent to all Thales staff and its sub-contractors' staff reminding them of the Thales policy, the *Working Time Directive* and QUENSH conditions requirements.

CIRAS NEWS

- CIRAS exhibited at the IOSH Rail Conference 2009, in November. The new CIRAS DVD, which was shown to health and safety professionals from the rail industry, and the CIRAS stand, received a positive reception.
- Collin Carr, Operations Manager, spoke to 400 delegates at Birse Rail's annual supply chain event in December. Collin presented in the 'Learning from Accidents' pod, where he spoke about unsafe conditions, the importance of reporting near misses, and how CIRAS can help those who may not feel comfortable using internal channels.



EDITORIAL

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Please note that CIRAS cannot accept reports at this email address.
- Electronic Newsletter: if you would like to receive an electronic copy of *The Reporter*, email us at newsletterrequests@ciras.org.uk.
- The full version of all reports and responses contained in *The Reporter* are available on the CIRAS website www.ciras.org.uk.

Delay in communicating ESRs to drivers brings Rule Book change

CIRAS has received two reports concerning the lack of notice given to drivers about emergency speed restrictions.

The *Rule Book* requirement recently changed so that emergency speed restrictions, that are only in place for a short time, no longer need to be communicated to drivers. One reporter cites the following information provided in a traction bulletin at work: "A recent amendment to the *Rule Book* module SP has withdrawn the requirement for Network Rail to issue a special notice advising of emergency speed restrictions that will be in place for a short time. These notices will no longer be published in late notice cases."



Where speed restrictions are due to damaged tracks, there is a risk of derailment

"both reporters feel that vital safety critical information is not being communicated"

Both reporters feel that vital safety critical information is not being communicated. One reporter gives the specific example of Shalford Junction, where an emergency speed restriction of 20mph was put in place. For the previous six weeks the speed restriction had been 40mph. The only notice that drivers received about the change was a reminder board just outside Guildford which didn't state the change in line speed. Unless a driver actually brought a train into Guildford this board would not be seen, risking a derailment. If the drop in speed is greater, the risk is increased.

The same scenario was experienced by the second reporter who came from Guildford to Aldershot station and continued north. At Aldershot station there was a reminder board at the end of the platform but it didn't indicate the speed. The driver

received no information of the speed restriction imposed on that line and later found out that the speed board was placed on the south side of Aldershot and only trains coming from Farnham would see it.

The usual speed restrictions on the section of track concerned are 50mph through a tunnel and 70mph after the tunnel. After the tunnel there is a bend where the driver was confronted with a 20mph speed board. The driver had to brake sharply. Even though the driver was aware that a speed restriction was coming up, he was alarmed to see that it was as severe as 20mph.

"reaching the correct speed in time in such circumstances is difficult"

Reaching the correct speed in time in such circumstances is difficult and, where speed restrictions are due to damaged tracks, there is a real risk of derailment.



Approaching Shalford Junction

Image: Marcus Dawson

Assembly of scaffolding towers



Mobile scaffold towers must be erected correctly

A reporter is querying the assembly of scaffolding towers, which are currently being used for work at certain stations. The reporter is aware of work occurring where scaffolds are unsteady and have been constructed with some parts missing, for example when outriggers and hand rails were not fitted. If the scaffolding towers are not set up correctly, there is a risk of someone falling and being seriously injured.

Could the company responsible please clarify the type of scaffolding towers that are being used for these station jobs and ensure that they are being used correctly?

Response:

In accordance with Southeastern Trains and Network Rail rules, the mobile tower scaffolding used is of fibreglass construction. These towers are supplied by approved plant hire companies. The number and type of scaffolding required is specified to the hire company along with the time, date and site location. Staff are only permitted to erect, alter and take down any mobile scaffolding tower if trained and certificated to PASMA or equivalent.

All mobile tower inspections, after erection, alteration or movement are recorded in the site diary daily log book. Any mobile towers that are left erected overnight are inspected before first use the next day or before the next occasion of use. Where any shortages of supplied scaffolding parts are identified, the hire company is notified and the required scaffolding shortfall is requested for immediate delivery. The competent person is instructed not to allow the mobile tower to be erected until the required parts are supplied.


Both reporters would like to see:

- all emergency speed restrictions published in the late notices as they used to be;
- speed boards displayed at the end of platforms, in view of drivers coming from any direction;
- RSSB specify why there is no longer a requirement to communicate information about emergency speed restrictions in the late notices;
- a review of the way emergency speed boards are positioned since the *Rule Book* was changed and drivers no longer receive notification of emergency speed restrictions; and
- the speed displayed at the end of the platforms with the 'R' boards so that drivers are aware of the exact speed restriction.

Response from Network Rail:

Network Rail would like to thank the reporter for raising the above concern regarding communication of ESRs. Safety is a highly important issue for Network Rail. The *Rule Book* change to the requirement to issue a special notice advising train operators of an ESR was withdrawn in June 2008, as the result of a change proposal submitted to the RSSB by a train operator. Emergency indicators and additional portable AWS magnets are provided on all the approaches to an ESR. These provide drivers with a visual, and audible, warning when approaching an ESR.

A review of these rules by RSSB has taken place and amendments to *Rule Book*, module SP will be published in the December AM module (issue 9). We would also like to remind readers that, where drivers may experience confusion with the position of the ESR boards, they should stop their train and communicate with the controlling signaller to make certain of a clear understanding of the speed restriction required.




Response from RSSB:

The RSSB proposed changes to lineside signs which were agreed by the relevant Standards Committees. In future, the repeating warning board (R board) will show the actual speed of the restriction.

"new lineside signs have been included in Rule Book module SP"

The new lineside signs have been included in *Rule Book* module SP – they were published in October in module AM and will be in force from the first Saturday in December 2009.

For more infrastructure reports and responses please visit our website www.ciras.org.uk



New Rule Book illustration

Platform 10 four foot – Glasgow Central station

A reporter has expressed concern about the detaching of the '5M11' which arrives onto platform ten at Glasgow Central station. Drivers are expected to detach the locomotive once it has arrived on the platform. To do this they have to stand in the four-foot of the platform where the ground is full of old oil, stagnant water, human waste and other waste products. The waste is believed to have come from passenger toilets that are being used while the train is stationary on the platform. The reporter asks if the ground could be cleaned regularly to avoid the risk of slipping and the risk of catching any diseases from this waste. Is this possible?

Response from Network Rail:

Network Rail would like to thank the reporter for raising the above concern regarding platform ten of Glasgow Central station. Safety is a highly important issue for Network Rail. Station inspections have also highlighted the reporter's concerns and as a result an action plan has been implemented to address this

"as a result an action plan has been implemented"

unpleasant issue. Work commenced on platform ten followed by additional work on platforms one, two, six and seven. These platforms were also identified as badly contaminated platforms.

Periodic work will be undertaken to manage the contamination problem at this location. It is anticipated that the situation at Glasgow Central will be vastly improved.



Image: J Pilborough

Platform 10 Glasgow Central station



When should platform possession be taken?

The reporter is concerned that platform lights are frequently being installed on the limit of the safe working distance, four feet from the platform edge. Because scaffolding and ladders often need to be three metres tall to reach the lights, they could fall across the line. There is also a risk to passengers who may attempt to walk around scaffolding, closer to the platform edge. The reporter asks; should a possession be taken in such cases for any work with scaffolding and ladders close to the platform edge; does the *Rule Book* confirm that a possession should be used in such cases; and does the equipment used affect how far contractors can work from the edge?

Response from RSSB:

Installation of lighting must be considered as engineering work when being performed 'on or near the line' if carried out within 1.25m of the platform edge and a COSS must be appointed to take charge. However, if a ladder or scaffolding tower is to be erected then consideration to rules must be given even at a greater distance than 1.25m from the platform edge. The method statement given to the contractor of how the work is to take place should take account of other factors.

Just because a ladder is erected within 1.25m of the platform edge does not mean that possessions or blockages to trains must be arranged, as the work itself may be able to be carried out without the safety of passing trains being affected - scaffolding towers on wheels can be secured to prevent movement and ladders can be secured. The method statement will describe how this is to be done.

Electrical contractors 'too close' to the platform edge

A report has been prompted by recent work installing lights at two large stations where electrical contractors were working close to the platform edge. Electrical contractors working for Network Rail are not usually railway staff and therefore less aware of the risks. Station staff are responsible for the safety of people working on the platform, but not normally briefed on the section of the *Rule Book* about using plant or equipment when working on or near the line.

"station staff are responsible for the safety of people working on the platform"

The reporter is concerned that platform lights are frequently being installed on the limit of the safe working distance, four feet from the platform edge. Because scaffolding and ladders often need to be three metres

tall to reach the lights, they could fall across the line. There is also a risk to passengers who may attempt to walk around scaffolding, closer to the platform edge. The reporter asks; should a possession be taken in such cases for any work with scaffolding and ladders close to the platform edge; does the *Rule Book* confirm that a possession should be used in such cases; and does the equipment used affect how far contractors can work from the edge?

To help understand this, it is necessary to read *Rule Book* module G1 and T6. Although not all of the work may be 'on or near the line' when the work is more than 1.25m from the platform edge, module T6 section 8.1 lists several types of work that must be considered as work that will affect the safety of the line. This list includes work attaching anything to a railway structure or equipment such as a bridge, station roof, signal or electrical equipment. The list also includes: work affecting wires, cables or signalling equipment; and using ladders, digging holes or stacking materials or equipment close to the line or near the edge of a platform. Module T6 section 8.2 goes on to tell the person in charge of any work that will affect the safety of the line that a COSS must be appointed and the COSS must agree for that work to start.

Train movement continues despite isolation of on-train safety systems

One reporter understands that after emergency safety systems on board CrossCountry trains are disabled, trains are still running with passengers on board. Even though the emergency bypass switch (EBS) and traction interlock switch (TIS) safety systems that control the trains braking and doors were isolated, relevant safety checks were not carried out. In accordance with the *Rule Book* (module TW5), a driver must report to the signaller defective or isolated equipment that will affect the movement of a train.

For EBS isolations, the driver should examine the defective equipment. All passengers should be disembarked at the next manned station and the train should then continue as empty rolling stock to a suitable location for maintenance attention. In the case of a TIS isolation, train guards should physically check train doors are securely closed.

Response from CrossCountry:

When safety related equipment becomes defective CrossCountry apply the safest method of working at the appropriate time in accordance with both the *Rule Book* requirements and the company specific policy for dealing with defective on-train equipment.

The *Rule Book* module TW5 covers both situations mentioned by the reporter and part A 2.10 refers the reader to company defective on train equipment contingency plans. The company contingency plan is a plan agreed with the infrastructure manager, Network Rail. When safety related equipment becomes defective on a train in service both CrossCountry and Network Rail make reference to this document and jointly agree the safest course of action to either repair, turn, top or terminate the train as necessary.

In the specific circumstances mentioned by the reporter CrossCountry and Network Rail control would refer to the contingency plan and agree the most suitable course of action. This would include where the train could be taken out of service without exposing customers to other and potentially greater



Image: Adambro

A driver must report defective equipment to the signaller

The reporter is aware of situations occurring when these safety protocols haven't been followed and trains have run with passengers still on board even though the powered isolation switch isn't functioning - this means that passenger communications

risks such as adverse weather, inadequate shelter or lighting and unstaffed stations with no support for persons with disabilities or special needs. The CrossCountry defective on train equipment contingency policy is quite detailed and is aimed for use by control staff. However, guidance is provided to



For more TOC reports and responses please visit our website www.ciras.org.uk

Image: Hyperen

CrossCountry apply the safest method of working at the appropriate time

cannot be used for the rest of the journey. The reporter's main concerns are that if relevant safety protocol is not adhered to, doors could be left open, someone could fall onto tracks and passengers would be unable to bring emergency issues to the attention of train crew.

"could CrossCountry trains ensure all train crew are briefed about different safety procedures?"

The reporter would like to know why trains are allowed to continue their journeys with passengers on board when the *Rule Book* states otherwise?

Also, could CrossCountry Trains ensure all train crew are briefed about the different safety procedures that must be followed when equipment isolations occur?

drivers, train managers and senior conductors in the CrossCountry working instructions, general section, which details places where trains may be turned or terminated for operational reasons or following safety related defective on train equipment.

